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ABSTRACT
 
This report describes the collision avoidance system tech­
nical evaluation (CASTE) computer program developed for the
 
simulation of PWI systems operating in air terminal traffic.
 
The traffic model is comprised of measured flight tracks from the
 
FAA Atlanta ARTS facility and intruder tracks generated by pro­
gram instructions. The program is designed to provide an evalua­
tion of PWI system performance in the air traffic model by
 
comparing the alarms produced to the collision hazards that
 
exist;
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SECTION 1
 
INTRODUCTION
 
This report covers Phase I of a study to evaluate the per­
formance of candidate configurations of the NASA/ERC proximity
 
warning indicator (PWI) for aircraft flying in terminal air
 
traffic. The objective of Phase 1 is to develop the computer
 
program that will be used in the study. Hereafter it will be
 
called the COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM TECHNICAL EVALUATION
 
(CASTE) program.
 
The ERC PWI, as now envisioned, is an optical infrared
 
system employing the xenon flash from the standard beacon on
 
an aircraft.. The flash is to be sensed by an optical detector
 
carried by the "protected" aircraft.* The PWI system is cur­
rently under development, so the final configuration of the
 
system remains to be established.
 
The CASTE program, to be of the greatest value in the de­
velopment phase of the PWI, has been designed to be as flexible
 
as possible in order to serve in the evaluation of various con­
figurations, operational parameters, and alarm logic. Therefore,
 
the program was written as a group of readily modifiable or re­
placeable subroutines.
 
*Throughout this report the terminology "protected" aircraft
 
designates the aircraft the collision avoidance system (CAS)
 
is charged to protect, and is the aircraft that carries the
 
CAS; all other aircraft are designated "threat" aircraft with
 
respect to the protected aircraft.
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The data input to the CASTE program describing the flight
 
tracks are the FAA Atlanta Airport Radar Terminal System (ARTS)
 
magnetic tapes and/or selectable tracks of up to 25 "intruder"
 
aircraft.* The.CASTE output identifies the hazard situations
 
and alarm events, and these data are stored on tape for evalua­
tion using statistical methods.
 
Twelve one-hour runs of flight data were obtained by the
 
FAA Atlanta personnel consisting of digitized raw radar data,
 
smoothed radar data, controller-pilot voice records, and con­
troller log sheets. The data were obtained during peak travel
 
periods in the morning, afternoon and evening at Atlanta,
 
Georgia.
 
At the FAA National Avaiation Facility Experimental Center
 
(NAFEC), Atlantic City, N.J., the Atlanta ARTS data were edited,
 
the altitude data were digitized onto the magnetic records, and
 
the resulting data were numerically smoothed. The FAA obtained
 
these data for use in air traffic simulation studies at NAFEC,
 
and they were made available to NASA for use in ehe present re­
search program. .
 
The CASTE program calculates the relative locations and ve­
locities of aircraft at each time from the FAA data and/or the
 
intruder aircraft input data. From these computed data the
 
flight hazards are then determined, based on any of four
 
*The term "Lntruder" designates an aircraft introduced into the
 
terminal area on a flight track prescribed by equations.
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-criteria. Simultaneously the calculations to simulate the
 
operation of the PWI system are performed.
 
In the CASTE output the hazard and alarm situations are
 
identified by aircraft pair, and the pertinent aircraft loca­
tions and flight data are given. The PWI alarms are compared
 
against the hazards to obtain the statistics of the valid alarms,
 
false alarms, and missed alarms.
 
The performance of a PWI would be rated by determining its
 
capability and reliability for detecting hazards. The satis­
factory determination of when a collision hazard exists then
 
becomes the performance index for the PWI evaluation. In many
 
cases, the selection of competing systems, and the gross selec­
tion of system configuration and parameters can be accomplished
 
without a precise collision-hazard index. However, when the
 
system performance reaches the level where differences become
 
relatively sophisticated to evaluate, then the selection of the
 
hazard criterion is subject to discussion and assessment. Not
 
to commit the present program to a particular selection of the
 
hazard criterion, four hazard criteria have been incorporated
 
into the CASTE program. Each criterion has been programmed with
 
parameters, such as escape time, that are selectable inputs to
 
the CASTE program.
 
The CASTE program has been developed and tested in all three
 
operational forms: ARTS data input, intruder data input, and
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combined ARTS data and intruder data input. Results have been
 
obtained for one hour of the ARTS data, Hour 10.
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SECTION 2
 
TERMINAL AREA DATA
 
2.1 CAS Coordinate System
 
The coordinate system used in this report for aircraft
 
position and velocity in the terminal area is shown in Fig. 1.
 
V 
z 7 
ALTITUDE 
NORTH
 
NOTy 	 EAST 
Figure 1. 	COORDINATE SYSTEM FOR AIRCRAFT FLIGHT PATH IN
 
TERMINAL AREA
 
The x coordinate is directed East, the y coordinate North, and
 
the z coordinate is the altitude. The flight path heading from 
North is X, and the flight path elevation angle is y. The 
aircraft velocity along the flight path is V, and the component 
x, y, z velocities are i, j,and z, respectively. 
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The orientation of the coordinates of the collision avoid­
ance system (CAS) sensors relative to the flight path is shown
 
in Fig. 2. Here the aircraft is in a climbing turn. The
 
HORIZONTAL PLANE 
N 
. ,4D FLIGHT PATH 
~OF 

SVERTICAL AXIS HORIZONTAL PLANETURN 
 Y 
_L
 
NORTH
 
EAST
 
Figure 2. COORDINATE SYSTEM OF CAS IN AN AIRCRAFT
 
longitudinal axis-of the CAS coordinates is assumed to be
 
tangent to the flight path. The roll angle of the CAS co­
ordinates is assumed to be equal to the bank angle of the air­
craft, . The bank angle is taken positive for right wing
 
down.
 
The orientation of the threat aircraft (j) to the pro­
jected aircraft (i) is shown in Fig. 3. Here the polar co­
ordinates for aircraft j are oriented with respect to the CAS
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# THREAT AIRCRAFT () 
AIRCRAFTOF PROTECTEDPLANE 
Vi
 
PROTECTED AIRCRAFT (i) 
Figure 3. 	RELATIVE POSITION OF THREAT AIRCRAFT (j) IN POLAR
 
COORDINATE SYSTEM FIXED ON PROTECTED AIRCRAFT (i)
 
coordinates in aircraft i. The azimuth angle, 8ij' is in thL
 
plane of the CAS and the elevation angle, ij' is referred to
 
this plane.
 
2.2 FAA ARTS Data
 
The FAA has collected data for twelve one-hour periods of
 
aircraft operations in the terminal area of the Atlanta airport.
 
These data were taken during morning, afternoon, and evening
 
peak traffic hours within a five-day period. Data sources
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include the Atlanta ARTS raw radar data, smoothed radar data,
 
controller-pilot voice communication tapes, and controller log
 
sheets. These data were edited and combined at NAFEC to obtain
 
time-histories of the position coordinates and velocity com­
ponents of each aircraft in the terminal area. These data are
 
available on magnetic tapes in several forms that will be
 
described.
 
The ARTS system has a "track while scan" (TWS) computer
 
which predicts the location of each aircraft under radar sur­
veillance in terms of radar range and azimuth. The terminal
 
area controller initiates TWS computer tracking of an airplane
 
appearing on his PPI display by entering a track instruction,
 
along with aircraft identification, into the computer. So long
 
as the radar position of the given aircraft corresponds within
 
a prescribed tolerance of the predicted position, the tracking
 
of that aircraft-is automatically continued until either the
 
controller terminates the track or the aircraft passes beyond
 
the cutoff range for the radar.
 
On each scan of the radar the TWS computer determines -whether
 
the radar position of each aircraft target falls within its pre­
dicted imaginary "bin." If it does, a correction procedure ad­
justs the target position and velocity, based on the reported
 
position of the target. Then, using a weighting function based
 
on the target position history, a new predicted position is cal­
culated for the expected location of the target at the time of
 
- 8­
the next radar scan. A predicted velocity is calculated similarly.
 
Data for all tracked aircraft on each scan are put on a data tape
 
referred to as the ARTS SNAP Tape.
 
In the event the radar scan shows an aircraft target to be
 
outside its predicted bin, the bin size is increased and the pro­
cess continued, with a notation on the SNAP tape, called the
 
"firmness number," indicating that the data quality has degraded.
 
Good data quality is indicated by a high firmness number. When
 
the data quality degrades below a preassigned firmness number,
 
the TWS computer projects a permanent coast mode. In the
 
permanent coast mode the aircraft position is extrapolated each
 
scan based on the last available velocity. Velocity remains
 
constant in this mode. A keyboard entry by the controller is
 
required to remove the track from this dormant state and to
 
start reacquisition procedures. Sometimes, on the other hand,
 
data quality does not degrade to the preassigned firmness number
 
for permanent coast, but improves after intermittent degradation.
 
In this situation, firmness number increases (up to the maximum
 
of 31). Further details of the tracking procedure are described
 
in reference 1.
 
The SNAP tape data were combined at NAFEC with the aircraft
 
altitude information obtained from the controller-pilot voice
 
communications tapes by using the Data Synthesizer Program (DSP)
 
described in Reference 2. The DSP produces two kinds of output
 
- 9­
tapes, a binary tape and a binary coded decimal (BCD) tape. A
 
binary tape, designated as type A8 Tape, contains the informa­
tion shown in Table 1, for each of the twelve hours of Atlanta
 
terminal area data. A BCD tape, designated as type A7 tape,
 
contains only a portion of the information shown in Table 1.
 
The first set of DSP tapes of the Atlanta ARTS data pro­
vided NASA/ERC by FAA/NAFEC were the binary A8 tapes. These DSP
 
tapes contained the "unsmoothed data," so-called for reasons
 
described later.
 
Hand plots of the unsmoothed data were made on x, y co­
ordinates and z, t coordinates for a number of tracks for Hours
 
5, 10, and 11. Inspection of the tracks revealed serious
 
anomalies in the data, particularly during turns. A method for
 
handling the anomalies could not be reached from an examination
 
of the limited number of hand plots. Therefore, machine plots
 
of a large number of tracks were made.
 
A computer program was written for making machine plots of
 
the unsmoothed data using the Stromberg Carlson 4020 machine
 
plotter. All of the tracks were plotted for Hour-10 data.
 
Selected plots are shown in Figure 4.
 
Inspection of the Hour-10 plots, such as Figure 4a, showed
 
that the x, y tracks from the A8 data were frequently discon­
tinuous during turns, as can be seen by the "dog leg" in the
 
turn which occurs in Figure 4a near point (-6, -4). It was
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Type of 
Word Word 
I 
2 I 
3 I 
4 F 
5 F 
6 F 
7 F 
8 I 
9 A 
10 I 
11 I 
.12 I 
13 F 
14 F 
15 F 
16 F 
17 F 
TABLE 1
 
FORMAT OF BINARY OUTPUT, A8
 
Description 

FORTRAN control word
 
Number of targets 

Track number
 
Time 

x position 

y position 

Altitude z 

Firmness number 

Aircraft identification 

Aircarrier, military, 

general aviation
 
Type or class of aircraft 

Arrival, departure, over-

flight
 
k velocity 

5 velocity 

Radar range 

Radar azimuth angle 

Test
 
Units
 
One scan of radar
 
Seconds 
Nautical miles 
Nautical miles 
Feet 
I to 31 
Alphanumeric 
1, 2, 3 
1, 2, 3, 4
 
i, 2, 3
 
Knots
 
Knots
 
Nautical miles
 
From 0.0 to
 
0.9999
 
ii1 ­
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L 
reasoned that the data discontinuities, presumably caused by
 
radar moving target indicator (MTI) and TWS logic, would cause
 
unrealistic velocity and heading histories. These irratic
 
values of velocity and heading could cause false alarms if these
 
unsmoothed data were used in CASTE simulation. Therefore it
 
was decided to obtain smoothed data for use in program CASTE.
 
The FAA/NAFEC had further processed the DSP tapes by smoothing
 
the x, y, z time histories using nine point-least square fits
 
of second-degree polynomials in time. Velocities and headings
 
were obtained by the FAA using first differences on the smoothed
 
data. The resulting data were placed on tapes, herein called the
 
"smoothed" tapes.
 
The FAA, through NASA/ERC, furnished Kaman AviDyne with a
 
smoothed tape of the Hour-10 data, as a representative tape of
 
the smoothed Atlanta ARTS data tapes. (It should be noted that
 
the format of the smoothed tapes differs from the format of the
 
unsmoothed tapes.) The information contained on a smoothed FAA
 
tape is listed in Table A.l of Appendix A. For each time, each
 
aircraft identification number is given, together with the air­
craft x, y, and z position and the corresponding ground track
 
velocity and heading. The intervals between the times on the
 
tape are usually three seconds.
 
Inspection of the plots of the smoothed Hour-10 data showed
 
that the "dog leg" anomalies in turns were removed by the
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smoothing process, as shown in Figure 5. However, inspection
 
of the velocity and heading data revealed unexplainably large
 
variations in these variables for some aircraft. For example,
 
during one period of 27 seconds, the data indicated that the
 
aircraft velocity ranged from 159 knots to 250 knots and back
 
to 129 knots. The heading oscillated over a range of + 24 deg.
 
It was concluded, however, that the data generally fulfilled
 
the needs of a CAS study. Therefore, the decision was made to
 
proceed with the development of program CASTE using the data
 
on the smoothed tapes, despite these variations.' Nevertheless,
 
some future effort might be usefully devoted to applying ad­
ditional smoothing techniques to the data.
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SECTION 3
 
CASTE PROGRAMS
 
3.1 General Discussion
 
The general layout of the CASTE program is shown in the
 
flow diagram of Figure 6. The CASTE program consists of five
 
separate computer programs. The overall flow of the calcula­
tions in the CASTE program will be discussed here, and the
 
details of the five programs will be presented in the following
 
subsections.
 
The data inputs to the CASTE program are the FAA/NAFEC ARTS
 
smoothed data (magnetic tape) and/or the intruder instructions
 
(IBM cards). The FAA data are processed by the DATA PREPROCESSOR
 
PROGRAM (PREPR2) giving: aircraft position and velocity components
 
in the x, y, z coordinates, and roll angle, c, at each time
 
instant. The intruder instructions are inputted to the INTRUDER
 
AIRCRAFT MANEUVER PROGRAM (INTRDR) where similar data are com­
puted for each time instant. A magnetic tape output is obtained
 
from each of the PREPR2 and INTRDR programs.
 
The PREPR2 and INTRDR output tape data enter the CASTE MAIN
 
PROGRAM (CASTEM) through the TERMINAL AIR TRAFFIC SIMULATION
 
subroutine. Either or both the PREPR2 output tape and the INTRDR
 
output tape can be inputted into CASTEM. In the TERMINAL AIR
 
TRAFFIC SIMULATION subroutine, the relative orientation and
 
relative velocity of all aircraft to all other aircraft are
 
computed.
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ARTS 	 \CRITERIA 
DATA 	 PARAMETERS 
M/T 
FAA DATA
 
PREPROCESSOR 
PROGRAM ] [ '(PREPR2) M/T I"& 
XiE Ri)Z/ 	 TE R M IN A LI I ALAR M a 
XpYIZ I AIR HAZARD HAZARD PRINTOUT 
x1, Yr lziJ)i TRAFFIC CALCULATION COUNT 
SIMULATION I (AHEPI) 
INTRUDER M/TI 
A/C 
MANEUVER

PROGRAM 	 HAZARDS MT
 
(INTRDR) 	 HAZARD PRT 
0o0 	 ALARM I4 IN 
I 	 ALARMS DATA M/T 
_ _ 	 _ _ _I _ _ _I 	 I 
INTRUDER ERROR CAS 	 ALARMH ZARDVS 
INTUTOSI ERROR GA AADIPRINTOUT 
STATISTICS PSIMULATION COMPUTER 

SIMULATION 	 I I COMPUTATION I 
(AHEP2)
 
ALARM VS HAZARD
 
CEVALUATION 
CASE MAIN PROGRAM (CASTEM) IPROGRAMS (AHEP) j 
Figure 6. 	 NASA/ERC CASTE COMPUTER PROGRAMS FOR EVALUATION
 
OF CAS IN TERMINAL AIR TRAFFIC
 
Using the data in the TERMINAL AIR TRAFFIC SIMULATION, the
 
relative collision hazard between each aircraft pair is computed
 
in the HAZARD CALCULATION subroutine. Four collision hazard
 
criteria are programmed in CASTEM. If these calculations in­
dicate a collision hazard exists, the relevant data are stored in
 
the HAZARD AND ALARM DATA.
 
The internal alarm-analysis performed by a collision avoid­
ance system is simulated in the CAS COMPUTER SIMULATION sub­
routine. If these calculations indicate the CAS would alarm for
 
an aircraft, the relevant data are also stored in the HAZARD
 
AND ALARM DATA.
 
These hazard and alarm calculations are made for each air­
craft as a protected aircraft, treating every other aircraft as
 
a threat aircraft. If it has been determined that either a
 
hazard or an alarm exists for any protected aircraft/threat air­
craft combination, the pertinent data are collected in the
 
HAZARD AND ALARM DATA and are outputted on magnetic tape, for
 
subsequent analysis.
 
The calculations in program CASTEM are repeated for all
 
aircraft at each successive instant of time. The time interval
 
for each calculation is selectable, but generally it would be
 
taken equal to the time interval of the FAA or intruder input
 
data.
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The analysis of the alarms is performed using the ALARM
 
VERSUS HAZARD EVALUATION PROGRAMS (AHEP). Statistical data
 
are computed on the number of "valid" alarms (alarm when a
 
hazard exists), "false" alarms (alarm when no hazard exists),
 
and "missed" alarms (no alarm when a hazard exists).
 
Program AHEPl-tabulates the number of valid alarms, false
 
alarms, and missed alarms. Program AHEP2 computes the statis­
tical data on the distribution of valid alarms, false alarms,
 
and missed alarms as a function the duration of the respective
 
alarm type.
 
3.2 FAA DATA PREPROCESSOR PROGRAM (PREPR2)
 
To prepare the FAA data for use in program CASTEN, a simple 
preprocessor program was written. A smoothed FAA ARTS track 
history data tape is the input. The output data are put on a 
magnetic tape tobe inputted to program CASTEM. The function 
of PREPR2 is to determine the number of aircraft in the terminal 
area at each time point, to calculate A, S, i velocities from 
the information on the FAA tape, and to, trans-fer this informa­
tion, along with position and ID data to program CASTEM. 
Provision has been made in the output tape format to include an 
equilibrium roll angle for each aircraft. (The roll angle cal­
culation was not performed in the present PREPR2 runs because 
of the irregularities in velocity and heading data on the 
smoothed data tapes. All output tapes generated with the 
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present PREPR2 program have had the roll angle set to zero.)
 
The input and output listings for PREPR2 ate given in Appendix
 
A. 
3.3 INTRUDER PREPROCESSOR PROGRAM (INTRDR)
 
The desireability of being able to introduce an intruder
 
aircraft into the terminal air traffic for purposes of CAS
 
evaluation has lead to the development of a method of prescribing
 
the tracks for such aircraft.
 
The track of an intruder aircraft is generated by specify­
ing a series of flight segments consisting of simple maneuvers. 
Three general types of flight segments have been chosen as being 
representative elements of actual flight tracks: (I) rectilinear 
flight, (2) constant turn radius, and (3) constant turn rate 
(deg/sec)' The equations for the position and velocity of an 
aircraft following these three types of segments are programmed 
in INTRDR. For purposes of determining the orientation of the 
CAS sensor system, the bank angle 0 of the aircraft can be 
computed. All three types of flight segments require specifica­
tion of initial position xo, yo, zo, velocity V0, and heading 
X at an initial time to. 
The first type of flight segment, rectilinear flight, Table
 
2, is characterized as involving constant heading, constant climb
 
rate, and constant longitudinal acceleration. The heading x,
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flight path elevation angle y, and longitudinal acceleration V,
 
are specified for the leg. The position, velocity, and roll­
angle equations for this flight mode are given in Table 2.
 
The second type of flight segment, a constant radius turn,
 
Table 3, also includes a constant climb rate and constant
 
longitudinal acceleration. The turn radius, flight path eleva­
tion angle and longitudinal acceleration are specified. Equa­
tions for this flight mode are given in Table 3. One should
 
note that the turn radius convention used considers a clockwise
 
turn to have a positive radius.
 
The third type of flight segment, a constant turn rate,
 
Table 4, allows a constant climb rate and constant longitudinal
 
acceleration. Turn rate j, flight path elevation angle, and
 
longitudinal acceleration, are specified. Equations for this
 
flight mode are given in Table 4. The sign convention for turn
 
rate is a positive turn rate for a clockwise turn.
 
When maneuver specifications for intruder aircraft are to
 
be used in program CASTEM, the number of such aircraft are
 
specified, together with an ID and initial conditions for the
 
first leg for each aircraft. The different maneuver legs for
 
each aircraft are specified by giving the equation to be used
 
for each leg (together with all parameters for that equation on
 
that leg) and the terminal condition for each leg. The initial
 
conditions for each leg after the first are computed internally
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TABLE 2
 
EQUATIONS FOR RECTILINEAR FLIGHT
 
Initial Conditions: to' Xo' Yo) Zo' Vol Xo
 
Maneuver Specifications: V, y, X
 
Maneuver Equations:
 
x = X0
 
V = Vo +i (t- to)
 
x= ecos y sin x
 
S= V sin y
 
x x00 + (V0+ V (t,- t) (t - to) cos y sin X
 
= V cos y Cos x
 
2 "
 
+
Y= Yo Vo + V (t-t) (t - t0 ) cos y cos x
2
 
z =z o + Vo + V (t to) (t - to) sin y
 
0 2 
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TABLE 3
 
EQUATIONS FOR CONSTANT RADIUS TURN
 
Initial Conditions: to, -X0 2 Yo' Z, VolX0 
Maneuver Specifications: R,-V, y 
Maneuver Equations': 
xx0 +(t -t ) V(t t0 )
X = Xo + - Vo + Cos y 
V = Vo + V (t - to) 
= V cos y sin x 
y= V Cos y cos x 
= Vsin y 
.x =x o - R (cos X - cos Xo ) 
Y = Yo + R (sin x - sin xo) 
z =z + Vo + V((t t- t sin y2
 
4' = tan- V2 gCos
3y
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TABLE 4
 
EQUATIONS FOR CONSTANT RATE TURN
 
Initial Conditions: to$ X0o Yo, Zo Vo Xo
 
Maneuver Specifications: x, V, y
 
Maneuver Equations:
 
V 	= Vo +v (t - to )
 
x 	= Xo + (t - to ) 
x 	= V cos y sin x
 
= V cos y cos x
 
= V sin y
 
o +  
x Xox O (Cos Xo - cos X) +.4- (sin X -sin X0 
A x 
(t 	- to ) cos X) Cosy
 
(sin Xo - sin X) - (cos x - Cos 
+ 	i (t - t0 ) sin cos Y4 
 x
 
v ( -(t 
Z = 0+ + -'V-.to (t t) sin y 
-

= 	 tanI (- cos27) 
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in the INTRDR program. The input and output listings for
 
INTRDR are given in Appendix B.
 
3.4 CASTE MAIN PROGRAM (CASTEM)
 
3.4.1 Terminal Area Model
 
At each time instant, program CASTEM obtains the following
 
information for each aircraft from the PREPR2 output tape arid/or
 
the INTRDR output tape: ID, x, y, z, x, y, i, 4D. The ID is
 
the aircraft track number assigned by the ARTS system. X (nmi),
 
y (nmi), and z (ft) give aircraft position while x, Y, z give
 
aircraft velocity components in knots. The bank angle 4 is
 
given in radians. This information is stored in subscripted
 
arrays. For purposes of identification, aircraft data, such as
 
x. are referred to by the subscript denoting the order that the
 
aircraft it-represents appears on the tape at the time instant
 
being considered. Thus IDi, xi, Yi, zi, etc. represent data for
 
the ith aircraft on the tape at that time; the ID number and the
 
subscript i are not identical.
 
The primary function of the terminal area model is to cal­
culate the relative positions, velocities and orientations of
 
each aircraft pair. For each protected aircraft i the program
 
calculates for any other threat aircraft j such quantities as
 
relative range Rip relative velocity Vij, relative closing
 
velocity Vcij, relative azimuth Oij, and relative elevation
 
- 26 ­
ii" The result of this calculation is a set of matrices
 
[ , Eij], , EJ], [ I]. The first three of these
vi 3 [Vc.]

matrices are symmetric; the last two are not. All diagonal
 
elements of the matrices are not used in any subsequent cal­
culation and are set equal to zero.
 
Definitions of Rij , Vi and Vc. are as follows:
 
xi ) 2 yi ) 2 zi ) 2 *Rij = &(I - + (yj _ + (zj _ 
2 i)2 + (j _ jiVij = (j - ji) + ( j - ) 2 
= - R..V c.. i
 
The angles ®ij and ij are defined in Section 2.1
 
3.4.2 Hazard Criteria
 
A criterion is sought that expresses quantitatively the
 
collision hazard of a threat aircraft to a protected aircraft.
 
Once this criterion is available, then the collision hazard
 
can be computed for each aircraft. This hazard criterion then
 
serves as a standard against which the performance of the CAS
 
for detecting collision hazards is evaluated. In the event a
 
collision hazard exists for an aircraft, then the CAS should
 
indicate an appropriate alarm. Conversely, an ideal CAS would
 
not alarm if there is no hazard. Because an ideal CAS would
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always alarm, and-only alarm, when a hazard exists, the se­
lection of the hazard criterion is critical to the design of a
 
CAS.
 
The most elemental hazard criterion is a "go/no-go" cri­
terion that indicates only whether a hazard does or does not
 
exist - a one-step criterion. In reality, it seems more correct
 
to say that the collision hazard of one aircraft to another in­
creases or diminishes on a continuous scale, so that a continuous
 
scale of the degree of collision hazard might be considered.
 
However, instrument flight rules (IFR) do not enable one to vary
 
the flight to a continuous scale of hazard criteria, so attention
 
has been directed to multiple degrees of collision hazard. At
 
present, in order to not become drawn into a detailed study on
 
collision hazards, a single degree of hazard has been programmed:
 
a hazard is said to exist or to not exist. Multi-degree criteria
 
could be programmed readily at a later time. All of the criteria
 
have been programmed with variable parameters so that any number
 
of degrees of collision hazard could be examined by making
 
successive runs.
 
The following four hazard criterion have been programmed into
 
the HAZARD CALCULATION subroutine.
 
1. Range-Altitude Guard Criterion. The range-altitude
 
guard, Figure 7, tests whether a threat aircraft at the
 
range R.. is within a hazard range, Rhaz, and simultaneously
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\ / ~ ~~PROTECTED 	 . '' . 
/HZR AIRCRAFT 
Figure 7. 	SKETCH OF RANGE-ALTITUDE GUARD CRITERION. GUARD
 
BOUNDARY FIXED IN SPACE
 
within a hazard altitude separation, Zhaz 
.
 
Hazard Criterion:
 
Rij Rhaz , and
 
1z1 - zil AZhaz 
The values of Rhaz and AZhaz are inputs to the program. 
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In the program this criterion is identified as the
 
"FAA criterion," following regulations that aircraft in a
 
terminal area under IFR fly the 1000-ft flight levels and,
 
at one flight level, be separated by 3 nmi. A tolerance
 
must be allowed for the deviations from flight level due
 
to flight technical error, so, in the calculations that
 
have been made, AZhaz has been taken to be 500 ft. However,
 
Rhaz and AZhaz are selectable inputs to the program.
 
A simple range-altitude criterion has some definite
 
limitations for defining collision hazards. One of the
 
principal problems is that aircraft operating under visual
 
flight rules are not restricted to the 3-nmi separation or
 
to the 1000-ft flight levels.
 
2. Acceleration Criterion. With the acceleration cri­
terion, the envelope of points that every aircraft could
 
reach pulling a constant acceleration a, during an escape
 
time te is computed. A collision hazard is defined to
 
exist for the aircraft if the envelopes for the two aircraft
 
intersect.
 
This criterion can also be expressed in terms of the
 
relative position, velocity, and acceleration to the pro­
tected aircraft, Figure 8. The vector Rij is the relative
 
position of the threat aircraft to the protected aircraft
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THREAT 
AIRCRAFT 
t2 
TOTAL t2 
OTECTED AIRCRAFT 
Figure 8. 	SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE ACCELERATION CRITERION. CO-

ORDINATES FIXED ON PROTECTED AIRCRAFT
 
and the vector Vij is the relative velocity. The envelope
 
of the maximum relative distances that the threat aircraft
 
could reach in time t from the relative position Vi t is 
represented by the sphere with radius atot t2/2, where 
atot = ai + a. If the protected aircraft falls inside 
the sphere, then a hazard would exist, according to this
 
criterion.
 
Hazard criteria: 
Rij + Vi tj < 0 (2) 
for
 
0< t < t 
e 
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where
 
Rij = (x. - xi) i+ (yj - yi) I + (zj z i ) k 
Vii = (ki - ki)i + (j - i ) j + - )k 
The values of ato t and te are parameters in this criterion.
 
The merit of the acceleration criterion is that it 
reflects a.physical limitation of the flight path of a 
threat aircraft-the acceleration that the aircraft might 
undergo. In addition it makes allowance for the accelera­
tion the protected aircraft could make in a turn. But, 
again, the problem is to assign numbers to the parameters 
involved-specifically, ai, aj, and te. For example, an 
acceleration limit for a normal turn might be 1/2 g. 
However, in an escape maneuver, the acceleration could 
easily reach several g's. So, if one desires to protect
 
against a threat aircraft that is escaping from a possible
 
collision, one might select an acceleration limit atot of
 
2 g's. Similarly, a number of values have been used in
 
various studies for the escape time, ranging from about 10
 
to 60 seconds.
 
The program is written so that both ato t and te are
 
selectable inputs to the program. In the calculations that
 
have been made, the values of atot of 1 g and te of 20
 
seconds have been used.
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3. Tau Criterion. Aircraft on a collision course for 
linear flight have a collision time given by T, where 
T = R..i/V . If a warning time, T crit' is allowed for 
thefpilot to avoid the collision-hazard, then T crit might 
be considered a hazard criterion. 
Hazard criteria:
 
(3)

VC.. crit 
Tau has been extensively explored in GAS studies as
 
a collision criterion, so it has been programmed in the
 
HAZARD CALCULATION subroutine. However, the-tau criterion
 
does not account for the component of the relative velocity
 
of the threat aircraft that is normal to the closing velocity,
 
Ve. It only accounts for the closing velocity Vc . If the
 
normal component Ve is large enough, the collision hazard
 
would not exist. Therefore, tau may be considered in this
 
sense to be a conservative criterion, in that the worst case
 
is used, i.e., V. = 0. In other words, because tau neglects
 
Ve, it indicates more hazards than otherwise would be con­
sidered to exist.
 
4. Modified-Tau Criterion. Another problem with the tau
 
criterion has been pointed out by Holt, et al. Two aircraft
 
might be flying parallel courses at very close range, yet
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tau would be infinite. The problem is illustrated in
 
Figure 9. The two aircraft are first flying parallel, and
 
tau would be infinite. Each could suddenly turn toward the
 
other aircraft, and tau could suddenly be so small that the
 
aircraft do not have sufficient time to avoid collision.
 
Figure 9. PARALLEL FLIGHT TRACKS
 
In the modified-tau criterion, a distance d is added
 
to allow for possible acceleration of the two aircraft. If
 
a warning time Tmod is allowed to avoid the collision
 
cri thazard, then Itmodcrit could be considered the hazard cri­
terion.
 
Hazard criteria:
 
(4)
Rij - Vcij Tmodcrit < d 

where Tmodcrit and d are parameters to be selected.
 
For aircraft in rectilinear flight and on a collision
 
course, the modified--tau criterion protects against ac­
celerations from the rectilinear path. This protection
 
- 34 ­
applies not only to aircraft on parallel courses, as in
 
Figure 9, but also, of course, on non-parallel courses.
 
This protection against possible accelerations makes the
 
modified-tau criterion similar to the acceleration cri­
terion. The difference is that the tangential velocity
 
Ve is neglected in the modified-tau criterion, so that it 
indicates more hazards than the acceleration criterion.
 
3

Holt, et al. present arguments for handling separately the
 
analysis of altitude separation and horizontal separation during
 
aircraft encounters. The two arguments of Reference 3 that are
 
applicable to the determination of collision hazards are: (i)
 
the aircraft separations in the altitude dimension are much
 
smaller than in the horizontal direction, and (2) the most
 
precise measurements are taken in altitude.
 
The altitude dimension is handled separately in the range­
altitude guard criterion, reflecting the differences in the FAR
 
vertical-separation and horizontal-separation standards. Re­
garding the acceleration criterion, the maximum horizontal ac­
celeration usually encountered in a turn would be about the same
 
as the maximum vertical acceleration in a climb or dive, about
 
1/2 g. Therefore, the acceleration criterion is applied in the
 
altitude coordinate in the same way that it is applied in the
 
horizontal plane. However, it should be pointed out that the
 
duration of the acceleration in the altitude direction generally
 
would be less than the duration of acceleration in the horizontal
 
- 35 ­
plane. But this subject needs more study before the hazards
 
can be differentiated to this detail. However, it would not
 
be unreasonable at a later date to incorporate different dura­
tions of the vertical and horizontal accelerations.
 
Regarding the tau criterion, the time to intercept on a
 
collision course, tau, is independent of the direction, so the
 
altitude is not treated separately. Finally, the modified-tau
 
criterion incorporates both tau and a protection against accelera­
tion, so altitude is not treated separately.
 
A final comment on separating the altitude coordinate from
 
the horizontal coordinate. Examination of data from the 12
 
hours of FAA Atlanta ARTS data indicates that the aircraft in
 
the terminal area generally encounter other aircraft nearly at
 
co-altitude. The explanation, apparently, is that most of the
 
aircraft in the terminal area are in the process of descent and
 
climb from the airport, so the tracks generally lie along rather
 
flat cones, centered at the airport. The principal situations
 
where altitude separation might be -involved appears to be either
 
where departing aircraft have turned and overfly arriving aircraft
 
headed toward final approach or where aircraft under Atlanta air­
port control pass near aircraft from satellite airports. The
 
ARTS data appear to indicate that these two types of encounters are
 
relatively few. This is not a closed question, however, because
 
altitude data were not available for about 15 percent of the air­
craft, which may be aircraft operating from satellite airports.
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Therefore, for the present, the collision hazard inthe altitude
 
dimension is treated the same as in the horizontal dimension,
 
with the exception of the range-altitude guard criterion. This
 
approach:is believed to be conservative, that is, the number of
 
hazards tends to be overestimated, and it is subject to a more
 
thorough analysis of collision hazard criteria.
 
All four hazard criterion are tested for each pair of flight
 
tracks at-each time instant. If any one of the hazard criteria
 
indicates that a hazard exists between a pair of aircraft, the
 
hazard data, aircraft trajectory data, and alarm data are stored
 
in the HAZARD AND ALARM DATA.
 
3.4.3 CAS Model 
The CAS model programmed into the CAS COMPUTER SIMULATION
 
'is intended to 'Imulate the tlass - f PW[--that, is,based on the 
detection of an optical or electromagnetic signal radiated from
 
a beacon.
 
The NASA/ERC Optical/IR PWI concept falls within this class.
 
It employs a xenon light source that radiates spherically, except
 
for blanking in certain sectors due to blockage by the aircraft.
 
The general equation for the strength of the receiver signal
 
P.j on aircraft (i) due to the radiated signal from the beacon
 
on aircraft (j) is 
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R..
 
R0j )Pij 2 [Alcos(B 1 'iT + A2cos(B 2 2 i) + A3 cos(B3 3i (5) 
R. 12ij i 
with cos Pny = 0 for PnYn > - or < ­fj lj 2 2 
Here Ro is the characteristic distance representing the one­
dimensional attenuation of the beacon signal in a uniform at­
mosphere. The distance-squared law of the radial decay of the
 
signal is represented by the denominator. The three terms in
 
the bracket represent three sensors on the aircraft. The con­
stants A1 , A2, and A3 give the signal for a beacon in a vacuum
 
detected by sensors directed at the beacon from unit range.
 
Each sensor is assumed to obey a cosine detection law with the
 
coefficients B1 , B2 and B3 indicating the off-axis angular
 
decriment. The off-axis angles of the beacon to the axis of
 
sensors 1, 2, and 3 are TIij, 2i. and T 3i, respectively, as
 
shown in Figure 10. The angles T..'. , etc. in Equation (5) 
are computed in the program using the azimuth 6ij and elevation
 
§ij angles'and the direction angles of the optical axes to CAS
 
coordinates. The convention for defining the direction angles of
 
the optical axes of a PWI is illustrated in Figure 11. These
 
direction angles are defined with respect to the CAS coordinate
 
system fixed to the aircraft, where x' is out the nose, along
 
the flight path, y' is out the left wing, and z' is up. The
 
angles between the x', y1 , z' axes and the sensor-optical axis
 
are respectively a,, bl, c1 for sensor 1, etc.
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THREAT AIRCRAFTf( 
. <2 BEACON 
AXIS SENSOR / /7I / / / 
SENSOR.IAXIS 

SENSOR 2
 
4AI SENSSOR 

O2
 
PROTECTED AIRCRAFT (i) 
Figure 10. ORIENTATION OF SENSORS ON PROTECTED 
AIRCRAFT RELATIVE TO THREAT AIRCRAFT 
LSENSOR I AXIS 
Figure 11. DIRECTION ANGLE CONVENTION FOR OPTICAL
 
SENSOR ORIENTATION
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When the receiver signal Pi in Equation (5) exceeds a
 
threshold for an alarm, Palarm' the alarm of the CAS is simu­
lated. The values of the times when the alarms occur, along with
 
other pertinent data, are then stored in the HAZARD AND ALARM
 
DATA, along with the other alarm data, hazard data, and airplane
 
trajectory information.
 
The above describes the CAS COMPUTER SIMULATION as it now 
is programmed. From time to time it will be desirable to alter 
the subroutine to study candidate changes in the CAS. For 
example, it may be desirable to evaluate a system with multiple 
alarm levels - perhaps, a "warning" alarm when an aircraft is 5 
nmi ahead, and successively more "intense" alarms at 3 nmi, 2 
nmi, etc. 
Other CAS can be. modeled using replaceable subroutines in
 
the CAS COMPUTER SIMULATION, provided the system employs only
 
measurement data on aircraft position, velocity, and orientation.
 
For a system that might employ measured data on acceleration or
 
higher derivatives, the CASTEM program would have to be modified
 
to store data at several time instants.
 
3.5 ALARM VERSUS HAZARD EVALUATION PROGRAMS (AHEP)
 
Two computer programs have been written for analyzing the
 
alarm and hazard data from program CASTEM. To discuss these 
evaluations, several terms must be defined. The definitions will 
be discussed with reference to Figure 12. 
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Figure 12 represents a time sequence of hazard and alarm
 
events. Time progresses to the right. The existence-of a
 
hazard or an alarm for protected aircraft (i) due to the in­
truder aircraft (j) is indicated, respectively, by a cross and
 
an x. At the first two times there is neither a hazard nor an
 
alarm. At the next 5 times the alarm-is on, but there is no
 
hazard; in the terminology employed here, this is called a
 
"false alarm." At the succeeding 4 times, there is a hazard
 
and the alarm is on, called a "valid" alarm. At the following
 
3 times there is a hazard but there is- no alarm, so this is
 
called a "missed" alarm. The objective, of course, is to design
 
a system yielding a small number of missed alarms While maintaining
 
a tolerable number of false alarms.
 
FALSE VALID - - MISSED " 
ALARMS ALARMS ALARMSL 1- 3 SEC- -
HAZARD •e• + ++ '4-++4" * 0• @ *O 
ALARM .. Q .+"". .* . . . "++ • 
EPOCH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Figure 12. EXAMPLE OF DIFFERENT ALARM TYPES COMPARED TO A 
-PARTICULAR HAZARD CRITERION
 
All of the alarm types must be considered together. For 
example, a system could be designed that has no missed alarms, 
by simply alarming all the time. In this event the false alarm 
rate would be unacceptable. 
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3.5.1 AHEPI Program
 
This program counts the number of times when there is an
 
alarm, hazard, valid alarm, false alarm, or missed alarm.
 
Therefore there are 5 numbers representing these totals. The
 
symbols Q, R, S represent
 
Q = total number of valid alarms
 
R = total number of false alarms
 
S = total number of missed alarms
 
AHEPI computes these quantities from the tape output of the
 
CASTEM program.
 
The 'total number of hazard times are equal to Q + S. The
 
ratios listed below are also computed
 
Q 
Q+S
 
R
 
r = 
Q+S
 
S
 
Q+S
 
The valid-alarm ratio q and missed-alarm ratio s would always
 
fall between zero and one. The false alarm ratio r has no
 
limit.
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It is expected that program AHEPI would be employed in
 
studies directed at determining how various configurations of
 
the PWI sensors, settings of the alarm threshold, etc., affect
 
the quantities q, r, and s.
 
This method of evaluation treats each time equally, without
 
consideration for how continuous the alarms or hazards may be.
 
3.5.2 AHEP2 Program
 
Program AHEP2 analyses the durations of the hazards, alarms, 
valid alarms, false alarms, and missed alarms. The symbol K 
represents the duration of a hazard or alarm type; specifically, 
it is the number of consecutive times of a hazard or an alarm 
type. For example, referring to Fig. 12, the alarm duration is 
K = 9, the hazard duration is K = 7, the false-alarm duration 
is K = 5, the valid-alarm duration is K = 4, and the missed­
alarm duration is K = 3. Program AHEP2 reads the CASTEM output 
tape and tabulates the frequency distribution of the hazard 
duration, alarm duration, etc., for K = 1, 2, 3, etc. The fre­
quency distributions are tabulated values of the following 
variables. 
Symbol Meaning 
NH(K) Number of hazard periods of duration K 
NA(K) Number of alarm periods of duration K 
NVA(K) Number of valid alarm periods of duration K 
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Symbol Meaning 
NFA(K) Number of false alarm periods of duration K 
NMA(K) Number of missed alarm periods of duration K 
After the frequency distributions are computed, AHEP2 cal­
culates the (cumulative) distribution functions and the com­
plementary distribution functions for the periods of the alarms,
 
hazards, valid alarms, false alarms, and missed alarms.
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SECTION 4
 
ERROR SIMULATION
 
The operation of a collision avoidance system is affected
 
by errors in the measurements and errors in the alarm calcula­
tion.
 
In most CAS systems measurement errors include altimeter
 
errors and range measurement errors. In an optical PWI system,
 
range, azimuth angle and elevation angle are measured. The
 
range measurement is the most critical measurement, and it is
 
affected by signal variation, scintillation of the recieved
 
light due to refraction in the atmosphere, atmospheric attenua­
tion due to haze, etc., and characteristics of the receiver lens,
 
sensors, and electronics. The azimuth and elevation angles,
 
on the other hand, are only measured for aid in locating the
 
threat aircraft, so accuracy here is not so important.
 
Alarm calculation errors reflect the quality of the elec­
tronic components and the circuit design. With reasonable care
 
in design and fabrication, these errors should be negligible.
 
The terminal air data employed in the simulation study re­
flect errors in the radar measurements and altimetry. The
 
Atlanta ARTS radar data are quantized in bins (increments) of
 
0.0625 nm for range and 1/4096 revolution (0.038 nm at a range
 
of 25 nm) for azimuth. These data-are smoothed on-line at the
 
Atlanta facility, so the resultant data would be expected to
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contain errors less than the bin size. 
The data were smoothed
 
further at NAFEC. On this basis, an accuracy estimate of ±0.05
 
nm would seem reasonably conservative (high).
 
Data errors were introduced evidently by the radar MTI sup­
pression system that screens out raw radar data where the range
 
rate is zero. In a number of cases the tracks in the Atlanta
 
ARTS data had gaps of 1/2 to 3/4 n m, where the TWS computer
 
temporarily went into a coast mode and later recaptured the
 
target. The data smoothing performed at NAFEC reduced the mag­
nitude of these discontinuities, but, unfortunately, at the ex­
pense of introducing large variations in the velocity - as much
 
as 120 knots in 12 sec.
 
The altimetry error is a prdblem common to both the CAS
 
measurements and the simulation data. Because of this, a separ­
ate study was made of altimetry errors for commercial trans­
ports and general aviation aircraft. The results of this study
 
are presented in Section 4.1.
 
The various errors described above can be introduced into
 
the computer program by employing an error generation calcula­
tion using the Monte Carlo technique. In this method the "error­
free" value of the quantity, such as altitude, range, etc., is
 
fed into the subroutine for generating errors, along with the
 
standard deviation of the error. The subroutine randomly gen­
erates values of the quantity based on the Gaussian error
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distribution. At each epoch, a number of random values of each
 
quantity would be used in successive calculations for each air­
craft pair in order to reflect the entire error distribution of
 
each quantity.
 
4.1. Altimetry Error
 
The altimetry error is subdivided into instrument error,
 
static pressure error, and flight technical error. The defini­
4
tion of these terms is taken from Gracey
 
Instrument error - statistical sum of the errors due to
 
the mechanical imperfection of the altimeter (i.e.,
 
scale or diaphragm, hysteresis, drift, friction, tem­
perature, instability and backlash) and the errors due
 
to readability (altitude and barometric-setting scales).
 
Static-pressure error - the difference between free-stream
 
pressure and thepressure registered by the aircraft
 
static-pressure source (static-pressure tube or fuse­
lage vent); for a given airplane, the statistical sum
 
of the fixed error (the error applicable to the air­
craft type) and the variable error (the probable de­
parture of the actual error from the fixed error).
 
Flight technical error - random deviations of an airplane
 
from its cruise flight level.
 
System error - statistical sum of the instrument error and 
the static-pressure error. 
Altimetry error - statistical sum of the system error and
 
the flight technical error.
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Data have been assembled on altimetry errors for three
 
classes of aircraft: general aviation, transport, and military.
 
These data are presented in Table 5. Either the 3a value or
 
the 99.7 percent probability value is tabulated.
 
The instrument error for general aviation aircraft was
 
measured in a survey made by Wright5 The error of 365 ft
 
represents the 99.7 percent value from the reported data. The
 
instrument error for the aircraft surveyed is probably even
 
larger than indicated by this value, because the instrument er­
ror was not reported by Wright if the altimeter had an excess­
ive leak rate. Of the general aviation aircraft, 70 percent
 
had excessive leaks in the static pressure system. In addition,
 
a few percent had barometric scale setting mechanisms that were
 
inoperable or malfunctioning. These were excluded in the sample,
 
so the error of 365 ft does not reflect these potentially greater
 
error sources.
 
There were no data on the static pressure error for general
 
aviation aircraft. If the static pressure error were also
 
365-ft the error would correspond to 0.13 q, where q is the
 
dynamic pressure. Presumably the static-pressure error would
 
not be this large, although it cannot be ruled out in view of
 
the surprisingly large instrument error found in general avia­
tion aircraft. In the absence of further data, the static­
pressure error is assumed to be negligible.
 
- 48 ­
TABLE 5. ALTIMETRY ERRORS (3a, 99.7%)
 
BEST ESTIMATE, FEET
 
6000 FEET, 250 KNOTS
 
General Transport Mil.
 
Aviation
 
*365(1) 40(2)
Instrument Error 

Static pressure 
Fixed * 15 * 
Variable 	 * 110 110 
Combined 	 * 110(3) 110 
132 (4 ) **System error 

600 (5 ) 120(6) * Flight technical error 

Altimetry error 	 700 (') 178(8) * 
• 	 No data
 
Highly uncertain data
 
(1) 	 Exclusive of (70%) data from altimeter systems with leaks.
 
(2) 	 Approximate ICAO (1961) value for precisior altimeters.
 
(3) 	 From square-root of sum-of-squares.
 
(4) 	 Probably somewhat large. Obtained from 35,000 ft data,
 
scaled by d
 
(5) 	 Negative exponential distribution.
 
(6) 	 Large non-Gaussian deviations at tails. Measured for
 
propellor transports. Assumed to be same for jet transports.
 
(7) 	 Computed from instrument error and flight technical error
 
assuming Gaussian distributions. Six times as large as
 
approach-landing error measured by Gracey (1960).
 
(8) 	 Computed from system error and flight tech. error, as­
suming Gaussian distributions. 55% greater than Gracey
 
(1960) measured for approach and landing. Main factor
 
is 110 ft variable static pressure error.
 
- 49 ­
The data on the flight technical error for general avia­
tion aircraft were taken from a survey of six types of aircraft
 
reported by Clay6 , et al. The 99.7-percent error is 650 ft.
 
Howevet, here it should be noted that the error distribution
 
approximates better a negative exponential than a Gaussian.
 
This means that the instances of large flight technical errors
 
is greater than for a Gaussian distribution. In fact there
 
were a significant number of excursions near 1000 ft. The
 
significance of the negative exponential distribution to the
 
collision hazard will be discussed later.
 
Combining these values of the instrument error and the
 
flight technical error by the root-of-the-summed-squares,
 
which assumes Gaussian distributions, gives an altimetry error
 
of 700 ft for general aviation aircraft. This is about 6 times
 
larger than the 115-ft* altimetry error measured during landing
 
7

approaches by Gracey7. However, it is difficult to justify a
 
smaller altimetry error in view of the large instrument error
 
and flight technical error that have been measured.
 
The fligh°t technical error of 700 ft for general aviation
 
aircraft is very large for the 1000-ft separations that are
 
allowed in the terminal area. Gracey4 shows for aircraft
 
All error data are corrected for 250'knots at 6000-ft altitude.
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separated along a vertical line that the collision probability
 
is near zero for altimetry errors up to 400 ft, increases to
 
10-5 for an altimetry error of 500 ft, and increases thereafter
 
at a very rapid rate for altimetry errors greater than 500 ft.
 
That analysis is based on a Gaussian distribution of the altim­
etry error. Trewek 8 shows that the collision probability for
 
the negative-exponential distribution is even greater (in fact,
 
the probability of collision is shown to be uniform between the
 
assigned altitudes, due to the large distribution at the tails,
 
whereas for the Gaussian distribution the largest probability,
 
of collision occurs midway between assigned altitudes). The
 
upshot of the discussion is that the flight technical errors
 
for general aviation aircraft are, evidently, large for a
 
1000-ft separation standard.
 
For transports the instrument error was given by ICA0
9
 
as 40 ft for precision altimeters. The fixed static pressure
 
error would be 15 ft at jet cruise altitudes if the ICAO and
 
IATA corrections are applied, and it should be less at 250 knots
 
at 6000-ft, but the larger value is taken here. The variable
 
static pressure error for current aircraft was estimated by
 
IACO to be 110 ft at 5000 ft. (4 ) This was confirmed in an earlier
 
investigation by Fine1 0 . The combined static pressure error,
 
assuming normal distributions, is 100 ft. Combining these er­
rors statistically, assuming normal distributions, gives a
 
system error of 132 ft for transports.
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The flight technical error for 19 propellor transports
 
11
 
was measured by Kolnick and Bentley . It should be mentioned 
for transports, as remarked for general aviation aircraft, that
 
a greater number of large deviations were measured compared to
 
a Gaussian distribution. Consequently the estimated altimetry
 
error of 178 ft for transports, which is the statistical sum
 
of the system and flight technical errors, assuming normal dis­
tributions, does not adequately reflect the high number of large
 
7
 
deviations. Gracey, et al. reported measurements of the altim­
etry error for approach landing aircraft, and the (scaled) er­
rors were 115 ft. This is about 35 percent less than the 178-ft
 
altimetry error estimated above. In view of the lower speeds
 
during landing approach and other factors such as reduced pilot
 
attention, winds, etc. at altitude, it is assumed that the data
 
of Gracey7 essentially confirm the 178-ft altimetry error as­
signed to transports.
 
Regarding the altimetry error for military airplanes,
 
insufficient data were found in the available literature on the
 
various constituent errors to make an -estimate.
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SECTION 5
 
HOUR-lO EXAMPLE RESULTS
 
The CASTE program has been applied to the FAA Atlanta ARTS
 
Hour-10 data. A few of the results are presented here to whet
 
the readers interest in uses of the CASTE program. A more ex­
tensive analysis, using the Atlanta ARTS data, will be the sub­
ject of the subsequent research phase.
 
One approach to studying the performance of a PWI system
 
operating in terminal air traffic is to examine each aircraft­
aircraft encounter where a hazard or alarm occurs. Figure 13
 
shows the track of an inbound airplane arriving from the north,
 
and Figure 14 shows the track of an outbound airplane simulta­
neously departing northward. The areawhere the two airplanes
 
experience the closest approach is shown in Figure 15. Arriv­
ing track 22 is at flight level 60 (FL60), which is at 6000 ft,
 
and departing track 25 is at FL40.
 
At the 647-sec epoch, the PWI alarm would go on for the
 
aircraft, for the particular sensor configuration and sensi­
tivity selected. The alarm would remain on for 18 epochs (3­
sec separation) until the 698-sec epoch. The duration of the ac­
celeration hazard for a 2 0-sec escape time and l-g total rela­
tive acceleration is identified in Figure 15a. The accelera­
tion hazard here begins at the 650-sec epoch and continues for
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6 epochs through the 665-sec epoch. Only one alarm epoch pre­
cedes the onset of the acceleration hazard. (This is very good;
 
but it would be premature to conclude from this one encounter
 
that the sensor configuration and sensitivity are acceptable.)
 
The alarm remains on for both aircraft for 11 epochs after the
 
acceleration hazard ends. This would tend to indicate that
 
the rearward-looking sensors have too great a range (although,
 
again, this conclusion is premature until more hazard situations
 
are examined).
 
The hazard period defined by the tau criterion with a 30­
sec warning time is indicated in Figure 15b. Based on this haz­
ard criterion, the duration of the hazard is 9 epochs, or 50
 
percent longer than the duration of the acceleration hazard. The
 
alarm goes on at the first hazard epoch. After the hazard peri­
od has ended, the alarm remains on for 9 epochs.
 
The hazard period as defined by the modified-tau criterion
 
with-a 20-sec warning time and a distance d of 1.06 nmi is
 
indicated in Figure 15c. The duration of the hazard period is
 
the same as for the tau criterion, 9 epochs, but it is delayed
 
in time by one epoch. The alarm goes on one epoch before the
 
onset of the modified-tau hazard and remains on for 8 epochs
 
after this hazard terminates.
 
Based on these three hazard criteria, the PWI system alarms
 
quite well for this particular situation. The alarm lingers on
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too long, but this would be readily corrected by reducing the
 
sensitivity of the rearward sensor.
 
A few remarks are appropriate on the various hazard cri­
teria used in these comparisons. The range-altitude criterion,
 
the tau criterion, and the modified-tau criterion are compared
 
in the range-range rate graph of Figure 16 with the parameters
 
used. For the particular encounter-shown in Figure 15, the
 
closing velocity initially is about 620 knots. At this high
 
a closing velocity, the tau criterion indicates a hazard first,
 
followed by the modified-tau criterion. If the closing veloc­
ity is under 382 knots, the modified-tau criterion would indi­
cate a hazard before the tau criterion. The range-altitude
 
criterion does not indicate a hazard for the example of Figure
 
15 because the aircraft are separated vertically by more than
 
500 ft. The acceleration criterion is not shown in Figure 16
 
because it does not have a unique curve in these coordinates.
 
The outer boundary of the FAA/ATA zone 2 criterion is also
 
shown in Figure 16 for comparison.
 
This is only one conflict situation. Many more conflict
 
situations should be examined to arrive at a satisfactory evalua­
tion of the PWI system. All of the conflicts occurring during
 
the 12-hour data period could be examined individually. This
 
procedure probably would be reasonable if only a few conflicts
 
were encountered. However, for a large number of conflicts, a
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6 
statistical compilation of the conflict data would appear to
 
be advantageous.
 
AHEPl, wherein the number of valid alarms, false alarms,
 
and missed alarms are counted, is useful for this purpose. This
 
program furnishes an overall tally of the various type alarms
 
and hazards. However, AHEPl data are not sufficient in them­
selves for evaluation of PWI parameters because they do not
 
indicate enough about the individual encounters. For example,
 
one long period of false alarms in a single encounter could
 
unduly bias the total number of false alarms. Therefore, along
 
with the statistical data of AHEP1, it would be desirable to
 
tabulate the encounters according to durations of valid alarms,
 
false alarms, etc., which is the function of AHEP2.
 
The work described above concerns the evaluation of a par­
ticular PWI system in the terminal air traffic. But for the
 
selection of a PWI system it would be helpful, as a design tool,
 
to provide data on the relative positions of threat aircraft
 
which are a collision hazard. This means to collect data on
 
the relative range, azimuth and elevation of aircraft that are
 
identified as collision hazards.
 
To indicate one way this objective might be met, the Hour-10
 
output data of the CASTEM program are plotted in the polar co­
ordinates shown in Figure 17. Here the polar coordinates are
 
centered on the protected aircraft and are oriented in the flight
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direction. In each cell is indicated the number of collision
 
hazard occurrences falling within the particular solid sector
 
element. Each occurrence is defined as one time when a hazard
 
exists. The data in Figure 17 are based on the acceleration
 
hazard criterion for a l-g total relative acceleration and an
 
escape time of 20 seconds. There is a total of 42 occurrences
 
in the Hour-10 data.
 
Figure 17a is an azimuthal plot of the hazard occurrences
 
for the elevation angle sector of -300 to +300. All of the
 
hazard occurrences fall inside of this elevation sector and
 
within a 5 nmi range. The greatest range for hazard occurrences
 
lies within the azimuthal sector of -30o to +300. Laterally,
 
the maximum range of the occurrences decreases. From 300 to
 
90w,.the maximum hazard range is only 3 nmi. Only one hazard
 
occurrence falls beyond ±900 , and this is within a 1 nmi range.
 
Figure 17b is an elevation plot of the hazard occurrences
 
for all azimuthal angles. As mentioned, all of the hazard oc­
currences fall within the elevation sector of -30o to +300.
 
From this examination of various presentations using the
 
Atlanta ARTS Hour-10 data, it is concluded that the CASTE pro­
gram is a useful tool for (1) the evaluation of a particular
 
configuration of a PWI system and (2) the selection of a PWI to
 
meet the collision threat situation existing in realistic
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terminal air traffic. The employment of the CASTE program to
 
fulfill these two objectives will be the subject of the succeed­
ing study.
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APPENDIX A
 
FAA DATA PREPROCESSOR PROGRAM (PREPR2)
 
This program reads an FAA Atlanta ARTS BCD smoothed-data
 
tape and produces a data tape in the format required for the
 
CASTEM program input.
 
The FAA tapes list smoothed data at 3-second time intervals
 
for all radar-identified aircraft. Each input record contains
 
the track data in the format indicated in Table Al. Each rec­
ord contains the data for one aircraft at one time. The records
 
are grouped in sequence of track number at one time, and the
 
record groups are in time sequence,
 
Several comments are in order concerning the values of the
 
variables in Table Al. The FAA fitted the radar data using 
a smoothing technique, providing fitted data at one-second inter­
vals. Data points are provided on the tape for all active tracks 
at 3-second intervals except when data points from the smoothing 
process are missing, say at time n. When this occurs, data are 
entered on the tape at the n + I second time. The tape data then 
return to the regular 3-second time at n + 3 after this one ir­
regular jump. When data points are found to be-missing at time 
n, and when the n + 1 list is incomplete, and the data points 
which are missing are found in the n + I list appear in the n + 3 
list, the values in the heading column H(1) are zero. Irregu­
larities in the velocity are also found on the tape. A minus 
sign preceding the velocity indicates that the value is 
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different from the preceding value by more than 10%. Also,
 
the first time a track appears, the velocity value is indicated
 
as zero; the next velocity listed for that track is flagged with
 
a minus sign.
 
TABLE.AI
 
FAA ATLANTA ARTS SMOOTHED-DATA' TAPE RECORD 
PREPR2 
FORTRAN BCD 
Symbol Format Description 
Blank IX Spacing on tape 
T FlI.i Time t, initialized at begin­
ning of hour (sec) 
Blanks 2X Spacing on tape 
NT 16 Track number 
Blanks 4X Spacing on tape 
X E20.8- x position (nmi) 
Y E20.8 y position (nmi) 
Z E20.8 Altitude z (ft) 
V F20.2 Ve-locity V (kts) 
H F20.2 Heading x (deg) 
There are no special start or stop indications on the
 
FAA .tape. The PREPR2 program tests each record to see if the
 
final track, final time condition exists to determine the end
 
of the tape.
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The beginning of the PREPR2 output tape is indicated by
 
a (-10, -10) record. Where there are no tracks or only one
 
track at a given time, this is designated by a (-10, -10)
 
record. Where there are more than one aircraft-at a given time,
 
a record is put on the PREPR2 output tape which designates time
 
in seconds and number of tracks (LT(NUP), NUP). Following this
 
header record, there is a record for the data on each track at
 
that time. These data are listed in Table A2. (At the present
 
time the roll angle is set to zero in PREPR2, because the FAA
 
smoothed data is not sufficiently smooth to give reasonable
 
roll angle histories using second differences.) The end of the
 
PREPR2 output tape is indicated by a header record containing
 
(-25, -25). This is followed by two END OF FILE statements.
 
For the convenience of the person running the PREPR2 pro­
gram, printed output is provided to allow inspection of the
 
results. These printed data are the same as in Table A2.
 
Operation of program PREPR2 using IBM 7094 systems and an
 
FAA ARTS smoothed-data tape can be done using FORTRAN logical
 
units as described in Table A3. Use of PREPR2 with FAA Atlanta
 
ARTS Hour-10 data required 16 minutes of machine time.
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TABLE A2 
PREPR2 BINARY OUTPUT TAPE DATA 
FORTRAN Symbol Description
 
Time and Number of Tracks
 
LT Time (sec)
 
NUP Number of tracks at time LT
 
Track Data
 
NTSAVE Track number
 
XSAVE x position (nmi)
 
YSAVE y position (nmi)
 
ZSAVE Altitude z (ft)
 
Vx x velocity (kts)
 
VY j velocity (kts)
 
VZ z velocity (kts)
 
ROLL Bank angle * (rad)
 
TABLE A3
 
PREPR2 TAPES
 
Description FORTRAN Logical Unit No.
 
FAA ARTS smoothed-data tape, BCD 11
 
PREPR2 output tape, binary 9
 
System output 6
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APPENDIX B
 
INTRUDER PREPROCESSOR PROGRAM (INTRDR)
 
Program INTRDR generates tracks of intruder aircraft using
 
punch card sequences of maneuver instructions specified by the
 
engineer. The output of the program is a binary tape with the
 
same types of information and format as the output tape generated
 
by the PREPR2 program, Table A2.
 
Three basic kinds of maneuvers can be specified, referred
 
to as maneuver types one, two, or three. These represent,
 
respectively, rectilinear flight, constant radius turns, and
 
constant heading rate turns. An intruder aircraft track consists
 
of a sequence of legs, each leg having one maneuver.
 
For each leg, constant acceleration is specified in the
 
forward direction of the flight path. The flight path elevation­
angle is also specified for each leg.
 
The initial location, velocity, heading, and flight path
 
elevation angle are specified for the first leg. A stop condi­
tion is specified for each leg so that the INTRDR program can
 
calculate the initial values for the next leg of the intruder
 
track.
 
Instructions for preparing the punch card input to the
 
INTRDR program are described below with reference to the card
 
layouts shown in Table BI.
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TABLE BI 
INTRDR INPUT CARD DATA
 
Card Type FORTRAN Symbol 
I IT 
2 NT 
INCT 
3 ID 
NML 
4 TTI 
XI 
YI 
ZI 
VI 
HI 
5 NEQ 
ITYP 
STOP 
VDOT 
GAMMA 
HDOT 
R 
Card Format 

112 

2112 

2112 

6F12.1 

I10 

I10 

F0.1 

F10.1 

F10.1 

F0.1 

F10.1 

Description and Controls
 
Output list start time (sec)
 
Number of intruders
 
Time increment At (see)
 
Intruder track number
 
Number of legs
 
Track start time (sec)
 
Initial x position (nmi)
 
Initial y position (nmi)
 
Initial z altitude (ft)
 
Initial velocity V (kts)
 
Initial heading X (deg)
 
Maneuver type for leg
 
I = rectilinear flight
 
2 = constant radius turn
 
3 = constant rate turn
 
Stop type for leg
 
I = time interval (sec)
 
2 = x position (nmi)
 
3 y position (nmi)

4 = z altitude (ft)
 
5 = heading x (deg)
 
6 = velocity V (kts)
 
Numerical value for stop
 
parameter in-appropriate
 
units
 
Acceleration V along flight
 
path (g's)
 
Flight path elevation
 
angle y (deg)
 
Heading rate x (deg/sec)
 
Radius of curvature R (nmi)
 
- 72 ­
There are five types of intruder track input cards. Type
 
I card specifies IT, the time when the output tape is to start
 
listing. The start time IT must be equal to the start time of
 
the first intruder, whichever intruder starts first. Type 2
 
card lists NT, the total number of intruder tracks and INCT,
 
the time increment (sec) for the output tape data.
 
Type 3 card specifies the particular intruder track number
 
ID and the number of legs for that track NML. Type 4 card
 
specifies the initial conditions for a particular track including
 
TTI, track start time (see); XI (nmi), YI (nmi), ZI (ft) position;
 
VI, the velocity (kts); and HI, the heading clockwise from North
 
(deg).
 
Type 5 card specifies NEQ, the type of maneuver for a given
 
leg; ITYP, the type of stop parameter for that leg; STOP, the
 
numerical value of the stop parameter, in appropriate units; VDOT,
 
the acceleration along the flight path (g's); GAMMA, flight path
 
elevation angle (deg); HDOT, heading rate (deg/sec) with clock­
wise turns positive; and R, the radius of curvature (nmi) in the
 
horizontal plane, positive for clockwise turns. The maneuver
 
type NEQ and the stop type are each designated by a single number.
 
The value of the heading rate HDOT is only specified with maneuver
 
type 3, and the value of the radius of curvature R is only speci­
fied with maneuver type 2.
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The correct sequence of input data cards must be observed.
 
In each run, one Type I card and one Type 2 card are placed
 
first, in that order. These cards are followed by a group of
 
Type 3, 4 and 5 cards for each intruder, one group per intruder.
 
Within each group there is one Type 3 card, one Type 4 card,
 
followed by as many Type 5 cards as there are maneuver legs for
 
the intruder. The card group for one intruder is followed by
 
the card group for the another intruder, etc.
 
A sample set of input cards is shown in Table B2. This
 
set demonstrates card sequencing for three intruders which have
 
2, 4, and I legs, respectively.
 
The (binary) output tape produced by INTRDR has exactly
 
the same format as the (binary) output-tape produced by PREPR2.
 
(See Appendix A for details). It is possible, however, to prepare
 
an INTRDR output tape for a single intruder aircraft at one time,
 
whereas the PREPR2 output tape only gives aircraft data if there
 
are two or more aircraft present. The reason for the latter is
 
that these are the data provided on the-FAA-/NAFEC ARTS tapes. It
 
is possible however, to prepare an INTRDR output tape for a single
 
intruder. This capability allows program CASTEM to be run with an
 
intruder tape for a single intruder at the same time as the- -
PREPR2 output tape is being run, to test the effect of an intruder 
on the terminal area alarms and hazards.
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TABLE B2
 
SAMPLE INTRDR INPUT CARD LAYOUT
 
Card
 
Sequence Card Type 	 Variables, Parameters, Controls
 
1 Control I IT
 
2 Cards[ 2 NT , INCT
 
3 3 ID1 ,NML 
4 First 4 TTI1 , X1l, YII, Z1I , VII, HII 
5 Intruder 5 (leg 1) NEQ11 , ITYPI1 , STOP1 ,, VDOT11 , 
GAMMAII, HDOTII, RI1 
6 	 5 (leg 2) NEQ1 2, ITYPI2, STOP1 2, VDOT1 2 ,
 
GAMMA12 , HDOT 12 , R1 2 
7 	 3 ID2 , NML 2 
8 4 TTI2, X12 ,YI 2, Z12, V12, HI2
 
9 5 (leg 1) -NEQ21, ITYP21 , STOP 21, VDOT21 ,
 
GAMMA 2 1 , HDOT 2 1 , R2 1 
10 	 Second 5 (leg 2) NEQ22, ITYP22 , STOP22, VDOT22 ,
 
Intruder
 
GAMMA2 2 , HDOT2 2, R22 
11 5 (leg 3) NEQ23, ITYP23, STOP23, VDOT23 , 
GAMMA 2 3 , HDOT23, R23 
12 5 (leg 4) NEQ24 , ITYP 24 , STOP24 , VDOT 24 , 
GAMMA 2 4 , HDOT 2 4 , R2 4 
13 3 ID3, NML3 
14 Third 4 TTI3, XI3, YI3, ZI3, V13, HI3Intruder 
15 5 (leg 1) 	 NEQ31 , ITYP 31, STOP3 1 , VDOT 31, 
GAMMA 31 , HDOT31, R31 
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For the convenience of the user of the INTRDR program,
 
printed output is prepared by the program to allow inspection
 
of the results, Table B3. These data consist of initial condi­
tions (Type 4 input card information) and leg specifications
 
(Type 5 input card information) for all legs of each intruder.
 
Following these data are a listing for each intruder of the
 
computed initial conditions for each leg and a listing of the 
computed terminal conditions for the last leg. These data start 
with time (sec) followed by track number, x (nmi), y (nmi), 
z (nmi) positions; k (kts), j (kts), z (kts) velocities; and P 
roll angle (rad). These data are followed by a listing for each 
time interval of the data for each intruder. The time appears 
first, followed by the data for each intruder: track number, x, y, 
z, x, y, z, and P. 
Operation of INTRDR using IBM 7094 systems is accomplished
 
using FORTRAN logical units as described in Table B4. Use of
 
INTRDR and a fairly complex set of maneuvers for three intruders
 
required 2 minutes of machine time.
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TABLE B3
 
INTRDR PRINTED OUTPUT DATA 
FORTRAN -.. ­. -

S mbo01 Description 
a. Initial Conditions and'Maneuver Specifications
 
Type 4 Input card information
 
TTI Track start time (sec)
 
XI Initial x position (nmi)
 
YI Initial y position (nmi)
 
ZI Initial z altitude (ft)
 
VI Initial velocity V (kts)
 
HI Initial heading x (deg)
 
Type 5 Input card information
 
NEQ Maneuver type for leg
 
ITYP Stop type for leg
 
STOP Numerical value for stop parameter
 
VD Acceleration I (g's)
 
GR Flight path elevation angle y (deg)
 
HD Heading rate X (deg/sec) .
 
R Radius of curvature R (nmi)
 
Terminal conditions for each leg
 
TSTO Time (sec)
 
IDSTO Track identification number
 
XX x position (nmi)
 
YY y position (nmi)
 
ZZ z altitude (nmi)
 
VX i velocity (kts)
 
VY j velocity (kts)
 
VZ z velocity (kts)
 
ROLL Bank angle 0 (rad)
 
b. Data for each time
 
Time and number of tracks
 
ITS Time (sec)
 
INDEX Number of track at time ITS
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TABLE B3 (6ont'd) 
FORTRAN
 
Sybo Descrition 
Track data
 
IDS Track identification number
 
XS x position (nmi)
 
YS y position (nmi)
 
ZS z altitude (ft)
 
VXS x velocity (kts)
 
VYS 5 velocity (kts)
 
VZS z velocity (kts)
 
ROLLS Bank angle ¢ (rad)
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TABLE B4
 
INTRDR CARDS AND TAPES 
Description FORTRAN Logical Unit No.
 
Input cards 5
 
INTRDR output tape, binary 9
 
System output 6
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APPENDIX C 
CASTE MAIN PROGRAM (CASTEM) 
The CASTE main program (CASTEM) uses as input either the
 
PREPR2 output tape, INTRDR output tape, or both tapes. Program
 
CASTEM determines times when alarms are generated by the CAS
 
being simulated or times when hazard conditions exist, as
 
defined by the hazard criteria. The hazard conditions are de­
termined in the HAZARD CALCULATION subroutine, and the CAS
 
simulation is performed in the CAS COMPUTER SIMULATION sub­
routine. All input-output functions and most geometrical cal­
culations are performed in TERMINAL AIR TRAFFIC SIMULATION.
 
Four hazard criteria, defined in Section 3.4.2, have been
 
programmed: the range-altitude guard criterion, the accelera­
tion criterion, the tau criterion, and the modified-tau cri­
terion.
 
Currently, program CASTEM simulates operation of the NASA/
 
ERC optical/IR PWI.
 
The format of the input tapes has been described in
 
Appendices A and B. The input parameters and program controls
 
are read into the program in three namelists. The first namelist
 
is called NAMM, the second NAMI, and third NAME. These are asso­
ciated with:the-CASTEM exe&utive routine, the hazard subroutine,
 
and the NASA/ERC PWI subroutine, respectively. A summary of the
 
data in these three namelists is given in Table Cl.
 
PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED.PRECEDING 
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TABLE Cl
 
CASTEM NAMELIST CARD DESCRIPTION
 
FORTRAN
 
Symbol 	 Description
 
a. Namelist NAM - main program
 
NRUN 	 Run number (negative NRUN stops automatic contin­
uation of runs)
 
INCT 	 Input tape time interval (sec), 3 sec for most runs
 
NSYS 	 Program control
 
0 denotes CAS simulation only
 
1 denotes CAS simulation and hazard calculation
 
2 denotes hazard calculation only
 
ISTART 	 Time CASTEM program is to start reading PREPR2
 
output tape (sec)
 
ISTOP 	 Time CASTEM is to stop reading PREPR2 output tape
 
(sec)
 
IS 	 Time CASTEM is to start reading INTRDR output tape
 
(see); set negative if only PREPR2 output tape is
 
to be used
 
NSUB CAS-subroutine control
 
1 reserved for other CAS
 
2 NASA/ERC PWI subroutine
 
PAA 	 Sensor alarm threshold
 
ITAPE Output control
 
0 denotes no binary tape output
 
1 denotes binary tape output
 
INTS 	 Time CASTEM is to stop reading INTRDR output tape

(sec); set negative if only PREPR2 or INTRDR out­
put tape is to be used
 
INTRDR output tape if PREPR2 output tape is not used.
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TABLE Cl (Cont'd)
 
FORTRAN
 
Symbol Description
 
b. Namelist NAMH - hazard subroutine 
D3 d in the modified-tau criterion (nmi) 
TE2 T crit in the tau criterion (sec) 
TE3 (Tmod)crit in the modified-tau criterion (see) 
TE4 te in the acceleration criterion (see) 
ATOT atot in the acceleration criterion (g's) 
FAAH Azhaz in the range-altitude guard criterion (ft) 
FAAR Rhaz in the range-altitude guard criterion (nmi) 
c. Namelist NAME - NASA/ERC PWI subroutine 
RO Characteristic length Ro of atmospheric attenuation 
of beacon signal in Eq.?5) (nmi) 
AI,BICl Direction angles for sensor no. 1, Fig. 11 , (deg) 
A2,B2,C2 Direction angles for sensor no. 2
 
A3,B3,C3 Direction angles for sensor no. 3
 
CAI,CA2,CA3 Gain parameters A1 , A2 , A3 in Eq. (5)
 
CBI,CB2,CB3 Optical parameters B1, B2 , B3 in Eq. (5)
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The sequencing of the namelist cards is Important, and it
 
depends on the values of NSYS and NSUB. Table C2 has been pre­
pared to list the sequences of namelists that may be required
 
with the current form of program CASTEM.
 
It is important to note that the program starts a new run
 
automatically if the namelist cards for the new run are stacked
 
in their correct sequence behind the namelist cards of the pre­
ceding run. To stop this automatic feature, a namelist NAMM
 
card with a negative run number must be placed after the name­
lists of the last desired run.
 
Program CASTEM produces several kinds of output: a binary
 
output tape, for evaluation by the ALARM AND HAZARD EVALUATION
 
programs, and several forms of printed output.
 
The binary tape is prepared for statistical analysis of
 
the alarm and hazard data. To obtain the binary tape set
 
NSYS = 1, NSUB = 2' and ITAPE = 1. The contents of a line of
 
the binary tape are described in Table C3.
 
The printed output that appears for NSYS = 1, NSUB = 2 and
 
either ITAPE = 0 or I is referred to as normal printed output;
 
it is much more detailed in scope than the binary output. It
 
includes lists of the values of the controls and parameters in
 
namelists NAMM, NAME, and NAMN. Following these lists is a line­
by-line printout of the binary tape output data, but with
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TABLE C2
 
NAMELIST- SEUENCES
 
NSYS NSUB Namelist Sequence Comments 
0 I (reserved for alternate CAS) 
0 2 NAM *NAME NASA/ERC PWI simulation only 
I 1 (reserved for alternate CAS) 
1 2 NAMM, NAME, NAMH NASA/ERC PWI simulation and 
hazard calculation 
2 * NAMM,*NAMH Hazard calculation only 
No number needed
 
*NAMM is followed by a title card
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*TABLE C3
 
CASTEM TAPE OUTPUT DATA
 
FORTRAN
 
Symbol Description
 
ISTOP Initialization record
 
IT Time
 
NT(I) Track number of protected aircraft i
 
NT(J) Track number of threat aircraft j
 
ALARM(I,J) Sensor signal Pij received by i from j
 
LFAA(I,J) Range-altitude guard criterion indicator for
 
aircraft pair i, j
 
0 = no hazard
 
1 = hazard
 
LTAU(I,J) Value of tau for aircraft pair ij (sec)
 
LTM(IJ) Tau-mod. criterion indicator for aircraft
 
pair i,j
 
0 = no hazard
 
1 = hazard
 
LACC(I,J) Acceleration criterion indicator for aircraft
 
pair i,j
 
0 = no hazard
 
1 = hazard
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additional geometric data about the aircraft pair under consi­
deration. These data are described in Table C4.
 
Two other kinds of printed output can be obtained. By
 
specifying NSYS = 0 and NSUB = 2, the printed output described
 
in Table AlO is obtained, except that LFAA(I,J), TAU (I,J),
 
LTM(I,J), and LACC(I,J) are deleted. The corresponding output
 
for hazard evaluation only is obtained by specifying NSYS = 2.
 
The printed output for this case contains only IT, NT(I), NT(J),
 
LFAA(I,J), LTAU(IJ), LTM(IJ) and LACC(I,J).
 
Operation of program CASTEM using IBM 7094 systems can be
 
done using FORTRAN logical units as described in Table C5.
 
Computation of program CASTEM using a PREPR2 output tape prepared
 
from Hour-10 data required 20 minutes of machine time.
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TABLE C4 
CASTEM PRINTED OUTPUT DATA 
FORTRAN 
Symbol Description 
IT Time (sec) 
NT(I) Track number of protected aircraft i 
NT(J) Track number of threat aircraft j 
R(IJ) Range Rij from i to j (nmi) 
IVC Closing velocity Vcij between i and j (kts) 
AZOUT Azimuth angle ij of j relative to i (deg) 
ELOUT 
X(1) 
Elevation angle Iij of j relative to i (deg) 
xi position of protected aircraft (nmi) 
Y(I) Yi position of protected aircraft (nmi) 
IZ 
X() 
Altitude zi of protected aircraft (ft) 
xj position of threat aircraft (nmi 
Y(J) yj position of threat aircraft (nmi) 
JZ Altitude z. of threat aircraft (ft)J 
IV Velocity V. of protected aircraft (kts) 
JV Velocity V. of threat aircraft (kts) 
ITI Heading xi of protected aircraft (deg) 
ITJ Heading xj of threat aircraft (deg) 
ICPl Angle *1 for aircraft j relative to aircraft i (deg) 
ICP2 Angle *2 for aircraft j relative to aircraft i (deg) 
ICP3 Angle 43 for aircraft j relative to aircraft i (deg) 
AhARM(IJ) Sensor power Pij received by aircraft i from 
aircraft j 
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TABLE C4 (Cont'd) 
FORTRAN
 
S.ymbo0 Description
 
LFAA(I,J) 	 Range-altitude guard criterion indicator for
 
aircraft pair i,j
 
0 = no hazard
 
1 = hazard
 
LTAU(I,J) 	 Value of tau for aircraft pair i,j (sec)
 
LTM(IJ) 	 Tau-mod criterion indicator for aircraft pair
 
i,j 
o = no hazard 
1 = hazard 
LACC(I,J) 	 Acceleration criterion indicator for aircraft
 
pair i,j
 
0 = no hazard
 
1 = hazard
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TABLE C5
 
CASTEM CARDS AND TAPES
 
Description 
Case I - Input: PREPR2 output tape only 
Namelists 
FORTRAN Logical
 
Unit No.
 
5
 
Normal printed output, CAS simulation only, or 
hazard calculation only 6 
PREPR2 output tape, binary 9 
CASTEM output tape, binary 10 
Case 2 - Input: PREPR2 output tape and INTRDR output tape
 
Namelists 5 
Normal printed output, CAS simulation only, or 
hazard calculation only 6 
PREPR2 output tape,-binary 9 
INTRDR output tape, binary 8 
CASTEM output tape, binary 10 
Case 3 - Input: INTRDR output tape only
 
Namelists 5
 
Normal printed output, CAS simulation only, or
 
hazard calculation only 6
 
INTRDR output tape, binary 9
 
CASTEM output tape, binary 
 10
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APPENDIX D 
ALARM AND HAZARD EVALUATION PROGRAMS (AHEPI, AHEP2)
 
Two programs have been written to evaluate the binary out­
put tape data from CASTEM. The first program, AHEPI, counts the 
number of times on the CASTEM tape that there are alarms,, hazards, 
valid alarms, false alarms and missed alarms. The ratios of the 
number of valid alarm times, false alarm times, and missed alarm 
times to the number of hazard times is computed; these ratios
 
are Q, R, and S, respectively.
 
There are four inputs to the AHEPI program. These are
 
placed on one card as listed in Table Dl.
 
Operation of the AHEPI program using IBM 7094 systems can 
be done using FORTRAN logical units as described in table D2.
 
Use of ABEPI for evaluating the CASTEM tape for the FAA Atlanta
 
ARTS Hour-10 data required less than 7 minutes of machine time.
 
The second program, AHEP2, computes statistical quantities
 
from the CASTEM output data.. First, the program computes the
 
frequency distributions of the durations of uninterrupted alarms,
 
hazards, valid alarms, missed alarms, and false alarms. From
 
the frequency distributions of these durations, the distribution
 
functions and the complementary distribution functions, as
 
defined in Section 3.6, are calculated.
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There are three types of input information cards to the
 
AHEP2 program. The input information cards are described in
 
Table D3. The Type 1 card gives the number of track numbers
 
listed on the Type 2 cards. The Type 2 cards list the track
 
numbers of all aircraft involved in alarms or hazards during
 
the time evaluated by the CASTEM program. Note that the list
 
size must be at most 63 due to storage limitations of the 7094
 
computer. As many Type 2 cards as are necessary to list the
 
aircraft must be used. The Type 3 card indicates the hazard
 
criterion to be employed in the evaluation. If the evaluation
 
is to be made for several hazard criteria, then Type 3 cards
 
with appropriate controls and parameters are stacked. The
 
final Type 3 card has the value zero, which serves as a stop
 
command.
 
The output of the various distribution functions calculated
 
by AHEP2 is tabular in form. An index K going from I to 50
 
(0 to 49 for the complementary distribution function) represents
 
the number of successive times of alarms, hazards, etc. The
 
time durations are obtained by multiplying K by the time interval
 
of the CASTEM evaluation. In the case of the frequency distribu­
tion functions, the number of aircraft having, for example,
 
hazard durations of length K is tabulated as NTH(K). Note that
 
all durations of greater than 50 are put in the 50 slot. For
 
the distribution function of hazard durations, NDTH(K) is the
 
number of hazard durations less than or equal to K. NDTH(K) is
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TABLE DI
 
AHEPI INPUT CARD DATA*
 
FORTRAN 
Symbol Format Description 
N 112 Hazard criterion control 
1 = Range-altitude guard criterion 
2 = Tau criterion 
3 = Modified-tau criterion 
4 = Acceleration criterion 
IT2 112 Critical value of tau for tau 
criterion (sec) 
P F12.1 Value of alarm threshold (should be 
same as PAA in CASTEM) 
IS 112 Stop time of CASTEM tape. To 
evaluate, entire tape should be 
set to -100 
*One card
 
TABLE D2
 
AHEPI AND AHEP2 CARDS AND TAPES
 
4 FORTRAN Logical,
 
Description Unit No.
 
Input card 5
 
CASTEM output tape, binary 10
 
System output 6
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TABLE D3 
AHEP2 INPUT CARD DATA 
Card FORTRAN 
Type Symbols Card Format Description 
I NAC 112 Number of track numbers in 
list (NAC must be no greater 
than 63) 
2 ID(1) 6112 Track numbers of aircraft 
ID(2) giving rise to alarms or 
ID(3) 
ID(4) 
hazards on the CASTEM tape. 
As many type-2 cards as are 
ID(5) necessary to list NAC aircraft 
ID(6) must be used 
ID (NAC) 
3 NTYPE 112 Hazard criterion control 
0 = program stop command 
1 = range-altitude guard 
criterion 
2 = tan criterion 
3 = modified-tau criterion 
4 = acceleration criterion 
PA F12.1 Value of alarm threshold 
(should be same as PAA used 
in CASTEM) 
TAUC F12.1 Value of tau critical for tau 
criterion (sec) 
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therefore the summation from I to K of NTH(K). Similarly, the
 
complementary distribution function of hazard durations, written
 
as NCTH(K), is the number of hazard durations greater than K, or
 
NDTH(50) - NDTH(K). Table D4 has been prepared to summarize the
 
nomenclature for the various distribution functions.
 
Operation of AHEP2 using IBM 7094 systems can be done using
 
FORTRAN logical units as described in Table D3. Use of AHEP2
 
for evaluating the CASTEM tape for the FAA Atlanta ARTS Hour-10
 
data required 75 minutes of machine time.
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TABLE D4
 
SYMBOLS USED FOR DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS
 
Description 

Alarms 
Hazards 

Valid Alarms 
Missed Alarms 
False Alarms 
Frequency 

Distribution 

Function 

NTA (K) 
NTH(K) 

NTHA (K) 
NTHNA(K) 
NTNHA(K) 
Distribution 

Function 

NDTA (K) 
NDTH(K) 

NDTHA (K) 

NDTHNA(K) 

NDTNHA(K) 

Complementary
 
Distribution
 
Function
 
NCTA (K) 
NCTH(K)
 
NCTHA (K)
 
NCTHNA(K)
 
NCTNHA(K)
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